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THE UNAVAILABILITY REQUIREMENT 
Aaron R. Petty* 
The Sixth Amendment provides that a criminal defendant is entitled to 
―be confronted by the witnesses against him.‖1  But this right is not abso-
lute.  Forfeiture by wrongdoing extinguishes a defendant’s Sixth Amend-
ment right to confront witnesses if the defendant wrongfully causes or is 
complicit in the unavailability of a witness.  But when the Supreme Court 
reiterated its approval of this doctrine in Crawford v. Washington,2 it left 
few clues suggesting how the doctrine should be applied.  Instead, defining 
the doctrine’s contours was left to the lower courts.  In determining whether 
the witness is ―unavailable‖ to testify, these courts have borrowed the 
―good faith‖ test traditionally used to establish whether a witness is un-
available for purposes of admitting prior testimony.3  In this Essay, I pro-
pose a more nuanced approach to unavailability.  In Part I, I review the two 
situations in which testimonial statements of an unavailable witness may be 
admitted at trial notwithstanding the Confrontation Clause: admission of 
prior testimony and forfeiture by wrongdoing.4  I then suggest, in Part II, 
that forfeiture by wrongdoing serves, in part, to remedy the wrongdoing of 
defendants who misbehave, whereas admission of prior testimony does not 
serve a remedial function.  As a result, I recommend in Part III that the 
standard for proving unavailability should not only be different in the two 
situations, but that it should be significantly lower in the context of forfei-
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  U.S CONST. amend. VI. 
2
  See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (link).  The Court noted forfeiture by wrong-
doing extinguishes the confrontation right on ―essentially equitable grounds‖ without expanding further.  
Id. at 62. 
3
  Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (link), holds that a witness is not unavailable, such that prior 
sworn testimony may be admitted, unless the prosecution has made a good faith attempt to secure the 
presence of the witness.  For recent forfeiture cases explicitly borrowing the Barber test, or assuming it 
applies, see, for example, United States v. Cabrera-Frattini, 65 M.J. 241, 245 (C.A.A.F. 2007), and 
State v. Mizenko, 127 P.3d 458, 502 (Mont. 2006) (Nelson, J., dissenting).  Jeffrey L. Fisher, lead coun-
sel for the petitioner in Crawford, notes in an outline of post-Crawford cases that Crawford does not ap-
pear to have changed the unavailability inquiry, only increased its importance.  Crawford v. 
Washington: Reframing the Right to Confrontation 10, http://www.dwt.com/pdfs/01-
05_CrawfordOutline.pdf (link) (last visited February 19, 2008). 
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concept of unavailability loses much of its utility.  Courts would do better 
to focus instead on relevant wrongdoing to determine when forfeiture oc-
curs. 
I. UNAVAILABILITY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL MATTER 
Two situations prompt Sixth Amendment concern with the unavailabil-
ity of prosecution witnesses: (1) admission of prior testimony and (2) forfei-
ture by wrongdoing.  Admission of prior testimony may include, for 
example, deposition testimony or testimony from a preliminary hearing.  At 
common law, only death and extreme illness were sufficient to excuse live, 
in-court testimony of a witness.5  A witness is obviously unavailable in 
death, and physical incapacity is a close second.  
Barber v. Page6 is the cornerstone of modern unavailability jurispru-
dence.  In that case, the witness was incarcerated in another state.  The 
prosecution never requested the attendance of the witness, but instead of re-
quiring live testimony, the trial court admitted prior testimony of the wit-
ness from a preliminary hearing.  The Supreme Court held that because the 
state did not make a good faith effort to secure the witness’s presence, the 
witness was not unavailable.  The introduction of the witness’s prior testi-
mony therefore violated the Confrontation Clause. 
Barber’s progeny extended the good faith requirement to numerous 
other situations.  Refusal to testify, loss of memory, failed service of 
process, and inability to locate a witness all have been held valid reasons to 
admit prior confronted and cross-examined testimony.7  The reason is ob-
vious: in all of these situations, the attempt to secure the witness would be 
or had already proved futile, and requiring a futile act would be nonsensic-
al.8  Good faith, as far as admission of prior testimony is concerned, simply 
requires an attempt to procure the witness, and then only when the result of 
the attempt is not already a forgone conclusion.   
The Barber rule allows for a second-best solution in those instances 
where the foremost purposes of the right to confrontation—presentation of 
testimony in the presence of the accused and cross-examination—have been 
largely satisfied.9  Good faith efforts ensure that when possible the jury is 
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This may influence the jury’s judgment of the witness’s credibility and such 
observations promote accuracy.10  But if confrontation cannot be had live 
before the jury, the Barber rule permits probative evidence to be admitted 
and considered without compromising the defendant’s right to confront and 
cross-examine his accuser at some point during the proceedings.  The ab-
sence of such probative evidence might otherwise deleteriously influence 
the jury’s accuracy.  
Unavailability of a witness is also a constitutional matter when the 
prosecution seeks to admit prior statements under the doctrine of forfeiture 
by wrongdoing.  If the court determines that a witness is unavailable as a 
result of the defendant’s own misconduct (or acquiescence in the miscon-
duct of another), the court may admit the witness’s prior statements without 
confrontation, cross-examination, or oath.  But how much effort to procure 
witnesses should be required in this situation?  If the purpose of forfeiture 
by wrongdoing is purely truth-seeking, as is the Barber rule, then the stan-
dard for unavailability in both contexts should be identical.  That is, forfei-
ture should require good faith efforts as well.  But if forfeiture by 
wrongdoing serves purposes other than or in addition to the admission of 
probative evidence, a different standard of unavailability may be more ap-
propriate. 
II. DECONSTRUCTING FORFEITURE BY WRONGDOING 
Like admission of prior testimony, admission of probative evidence via 
forfeiture by wrongdoing serves a truth-seeking function.  The Supreme 
Court recently couched this interest in the language of process considera-
tions:  
[W]hen defendants seek to undermine the judicial process by procuring or 
coercing silence from witnesses and victims, the Sixth Amendment does not 
require courts to acquiesce.  While defendants have no duty to assist the State 
in proving their guilt, they do have the duty to refrain from acting in ways that 
destroy the integrity of the criminal trial system.11 
Forfeiture, therefore, aims at least in part to improve the accuracy of 
criminal trials by admitting probative evidence in place of testimony that 
the jury would have heard but for the wrongful act of the defendant. 
But it is the misconduct of the defendant, not the accuracy of the trial 
process, that is the most frequently invoked justification for the existence of 
the forfeiture doctrine.  The misconduct rationale tends to be phrased in two 
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to take advantage of his own wrong,12 and the Supreme Court’s earliest pro-
nouncement on the issue in Reynolds v. United States supports this posi-
tion.13  Reynolds also suggests a second, estoppel-based construction: a 
defendant cannot complain about the loss of a right when that loss is the re-
sult of his own misconduct.14  But under either formulation, the distinguish-
ing elements of forfeiture are the wrongdoing itself and the court’s response 
to it (whether to ensure the defendant does not profit by his wrongful action 
or to turn a deaf ear to the defendant’s complaints).  
Forfeiture, therefore, has at least two purposes.  Its initial objective is 
to effectuate some notion of corrective justice by admitting testimony as a 
remedy to the defendant’s wrongdoing.  This is not an interest in derogation 
of the truth-seeking function, but rather a preliminary inquiry aimed at de-
termining what the court must do to effectuate that function.  The remedy 
applied—admission of prior statements—will always serve a truth-seeking 
purpose as well.  But whatever the extent of forfeiture’s corrective function 
might be, because forfeiture is concerned with wrongfulness, whereas ad-
mission of prior testimony is not, there is room to consider whether applica-
tion of the same standard for unavailability makes sense.  
III. THE (DYS)FUNCTION OF UNAVAILABILITY 
Two considerations suggest that a standard less demanding than ―good 
faith‖ should govern unavailability in the context of forfeiture.  First, courts 
require unavailability to admit prior testimony because if the witness is 
available there is no basis for its introduction.  Given that the witness was 
available to testify once, without a showing of unavailability, there is no 
reason to suspect why the witness could not be called to testify again—this 
time in front of the jury.  In the forfeiture context, however, there generally 
is no prior testimony, only prior (usually unsworn) statements.  Because the 
declarant has never testified, there is no reason to presume that she is now, 
or has ever been, available.   
  A second reason for a lower standard of unavailability concerns the 
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case to prove unavailability to the same extent as it must when seeking to 
admit prior testimony and requiring him to prove the fact of the defendant’s 
wrongdoing, the standard for forfeiture by wrongdoing is higher than that 
for admission of prior testimony.  This seems anomalous.  The prosecu-
tion’s (and perhaps the court’s) interest in admitting statements in the for-
feiture context is stronger because of the defendant’s wrongfulness, yet it is 
more difficult to admit them.15  A lower standard of unavailability would 
serve the additional interests militating in favor of admission.   
But how low should the standard be?  Forfeiture, as a general matter, 
precludes a party from asserting a right when the party has done something 
inconsistent with maintaining that right, not just when it has succeeded in 
its objective.16  Any act by the defendant that makes testifying in court more 
burdensome on a particular witness than it would otherwise be is inconsis-
tent with maintaining the right to confronted by that witness.  The degree of 
that difficulty—a measure of the extent of the defendant’s wrongdoing—is 
entirely irrelevant.  The bravery of the witness and the ineptitude of the de-
fendant in procuring the witness’s silence say nothing about the wrongful-
ness of the defendant’s conduct. 
Could it be that forfeiture does not require unavailability at all?  Such a 
standard would certainly be a boon to victims of domestic violence and 
child sexual abuse—two recurrent areas of concern post-Crawford.17  To 
reach this conclusion, we would have to determine that unavailability is not 
a constitutionally required element of forfeiture, and that it is not worth re-
taining in the forfeiture analysis. 
The first question is easily answered.  As a general matter unavailabili-
ty requirements simply effectuate the law’s preference for live testimony.18  
And live testimony itself is obviously not a per se constitutional require-





  Although the defendant has a stronger interest in keeping out statements that have not been given 
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Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747 (2005) (link); Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford’s Impact on 
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Whether unavailability is a jurisprudentially sound inquiry is a more 
difficult issue, but there is at least one reason why unavailability should be 
retained in the forfeiture analysis, albeit at a lower standard.  The unavaila-
bility inquiry serves to distinguish those wrongful acts sufficiently related 
to the proceedings to warrant the attention of the court (i.e., those that result 
in forfeiture) from those that are not.  For example, under the current re-
gime, if the witness refuses to testify because the defendant has threatened 
his family, we say the witness is unavailable and that because the unavaila-
bility results from the defendant’s wrongdoing, the defendant has forfeited 
confrontation.   
But a defendant may commit wrongful acts sufficiently unrelated to the 
proceedings or to the individual witness that do not impact the witness’s 
ability to testify.  In these instances, we say the witness is available, and as 
a result, there has been no forfeiture.  Unavailability thus serves to distin-
guish relevant wrongdoing, for which defendants forfeit confrontation, from 
other, irrelevant wrongdoing.  It is this function of unavailability, and this 
function only, that should be retained in the forfeiture analysis.  Limited to 
this essential role, the concept of unavailability and even the term itself lose 
their utility.  Given what is left of unavailability, it would perhaps be more 
useful to speak of ―relevant wrongdoing‖ as forfeiture’s sole criterion. 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Flanagan has noted that ―[t]he term forfeiture connotes an 
automatic and unintentional loss of a right upon the happening of a speci-
fied condition.‖19  The question now is what constitutes that condition.  Ra-
ther than focusing on whether a particular witness is unavailable, courts 
should inquire only whether the defendant engaged or acquiesced in wrong-
ful conduct, the natural result of which might reasonably inhibit the wit-
ness’s testimony.  This determination of relevant wrongdoing should be all 
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